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ABSTRACT – This article intends to show that Plantinga’s criticism 
against Bayesianism as an account of what is involved in rationality 
does not apply to all forms of Bayesianism. Swinburne’s version, based 
on a logical theory of probability, is an example of Bayesianism not hit 
by Plantinga’s criticism. In addition, the article argues that the problem 
of dwindling probabilities – pointed out by Plantinga in Warranted 
Christian Belief (2000) – vanishes in a Bayesian approach. So, even if it is 
not a sufficient account of rationality, Bayesianism helps to understand 
important elements of inductive reasoning, especially those relative to 
cumulative cases.
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RESUMO – o artigo pretende mostrar que a crítica que Alvin Plantinga faz 
contra o bayesianismo como descrição do que está envolvido na noção de 
racionalidade não se aplica a toda forma de bayesianismo. A abordagem 
de Swinburne, baseada em uma teoria lógica da probabilidade, é um 
exemplo de bayesianismo não atingido pela crítica de Plantinga. Além 
disso, o artigo defende que, em uma abordagem bayesiana, desaparece 
o problema da probabilidade decrescente, apontado por Plantinga em 
Warranted Christian Belief (2000). Assim, mesmo que não seja uma 
descrição suficiente da noção de racionalidade, o bayesianismo ajuda 
a entender importantes elementos presentes no raciocínio indutivo, 
especialmente os relativos aos argumentos cumulativos.
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cumulativo. Probabilidade decrescente. Swinburne.
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1  Plantinga and the Flaws of Subjective Bayesianism
As preliminary groundwork before putting forward his own epistemo- 
logical proposal in Warrant and Proper Function (1993b), Alvin Plantinga 
criticizes in Warrant: the Current Debate (1993a) all major attempts 
at describing the element that is added to true justified belief so that 
it can be considered knowledge. Among the dismissed attempts is 
Bayesianism, which contends that for a belief to be rational it must 
comply with two major constraints: coherence and conditionalization. 
Plantinga argues that these conditions, if taken in their full sense, are 
either insufficient or contrary to what one would expect from a rational 
human being’s doxastic behavior (Plantinga, 1993a, p. 115). In this text, 
I do not intend to go into much detail about Plantinga’s analysis of the 
Bayesian approach, but just as much as is needed to discuss, in Bayesian 
terms, his dismissal, in Warranted Christian Belief (2000), of a cumulative 
evidential justification of the Christian faith.
Plantinga construes Bayesianism as a theory of belief that interprets it 
in terms of degree, measured according to probabilities. The probabilities 
involved in the Bayesian interpretation are normative or “epistemic”, 
Plantinga says, instead of factual or statistical, since they measure the 
degree to which a belief is made probable in view of a set of relevant beliefs 
to which it is related. The usual Bayesian manner of ascribing a degree 
to a belief is by means of the betting behavior idea, that is, the amount of 
money the believer is prepared to bet on the proposition concerned. From 
the betting behavior comes the reason for the first Bayesian constraint 
on the rationality of belief degrees: coherence. In other words, according 
to mainstream Bayesians (the so-called “subjectivists”), coherence is a 
requirement for a belief to be considered rational because otherwise the 
believer would be subjected to a Dutch book – a situation in which no 
matter what happens he will always lose money in his bets. Irrationality 
here would basically then mean a behavior which results in imposing 
upon oneself net financial loss, which is an unacceptable attitude from 
a cost-benefit or utilitarian point of view.
The second constraint upon a belief degree, such that it can be 
evaluated as rational from a Bayesian point of view, is conditionalization 
or probability kinematics. According to it, my belief degrees must change 
in proportion to the probability of the propositions I learn. Since epistemic 
belief is a degree in conditional probability, and since the coming up 
of a proposition not taken into account yet changes the conditional 
probability, the believer’s belief degree must be updated accordingly. 
Again, mainstream Bayesianism justifies the conditionalization constraint 
based on Dutch book arguments.A. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
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In his objections against the Bayesian condition of coherence, 
Plantinga points out some problems in the assumptions made by the 
description of belief degree by means of betting behavior: why should I 
both bet on A and not-A so that I can be caught by a Dutch book? Why 
should I bet at all in what I say I believe? Wouldn’t it be much more 
rational to refuse to bet than to bet “coherently”? (Plantinga 1993a, p. 139).
As to his criticisms to the conditionalization principle, Plantinga 
remarks about what he calls the believer’s first credence function or his 
“Ur-function”: why should it have that importance? Why should I update 
the degree of beliefs that are not related to the one I learned new evidence 
about? Why can’t I change only the probability of belief A on belief 
B (P(A/B) without changing the probability of my beliefs in A and in B 
taken in isolation (P(A) and P(B), respectively)? (Plantinga 1993a, p. 147).
2  Cumulative Evidence and the Problem of Dwindling Probabilities
As was said above, this paper aims to assess Plantinga’s account 
of Bayesianism mostly in relation to his criticism in Warranted Christian 
Belief (2000) of a historical case in favor of the Gospel’s reliability as 
God’s revelation. According to Plantinga, this defense of the rationality of 
Christian belief falls short of grounding the credence degree compatible 
with faith because of the problem of dwindling probabilities. In other 
words, if we use the probability calculus for assessing how much each 
piece of evidence increases the belief degree in the Gospel we end up 
seeing that the more evidence we have the lower the degree we get.
The aim of Plantinga’s argument is to evaluate the epistemic 
probability degree of central Christian doctrines, whose conjunction he 
symbolizes by G. According to him, in the historical case approach the 
issue at stake is to assess the probability of G in relation to background 
propositions K, that is P(G/K). The method is to find out propositions that 
add up to K and to weight the probability of G in view of this sequence 
of conjunctions, that is P(G/T&K), P(G/A&T&K), and so forth. In order 
to accomplish this, Plantinga suggests we use one of the axioms of 
probability calculus according to which P(X/Y) ≥ P(X/Z&Y)×P(Z/Y). For 
many pieces of evidence in favor of G, each piece enters in the calculation 
as a probability to be multiplied, that is:
P(G/K) ≥ P(E/K&T&A&B&C&D)×P(D/K&T&A&B&C)×P(C/K&T&A&B)×
             P(B/K&T&A)×P(A/K&T)×P(T/K)
in which:
T = there is a GodA. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
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A = God would make some kind of revelation to humankind
B = Jesus teachings were such that they could be sensibly interpreted  
      and extrapolated to G
C = Jesus rose from the dead
D = In raising Jesus from the dead, God endorsed his teachings
E = The extension and extrapolation of Jesus’ teachings to G is true
Plantinga attributes high values to the epistemic probability of each of 
these propositions. However, due to the fact that they are multiplied, the 
result ends up being below to 0.5, and this is too little for the conviction 
force normally expected in faith. According to Plantinga (2000, p. 280):
The main problem for such a historical case, as I see it, is what we can 
call the principle of dwindling probabilities: the fact that in giving such a 
historical argument, we can’t simply annex the intermediate propositions 
to K (as I’m afraid many who employ this sort of argument actually do) 
but must instead multiply the relevant probabilities.
As mentioned above, in his analysis, Plantinga uses a formula of 
conditional probability according to which P(X/Y) ≥ P(X/Z&Y)×P(Z/Y), 
which is an expression of the third axiom of the probability calculus also 
known as the multiplication law. Now, the multiplication law provides 
the probability of an event E happening given the occurrence of other 
events F, G, H etc. In other words, using Plantinga’s example (2000, 
p. 273): knowing that 0.9 is the probability that Eleonore (E) is at the party 
given that Paul (P) is also there (and everything else we know about the 
world (K)) – in formal terms P(E/P&K) –, and given that the probability 
that Paul is at the party (P(P/K)) is 0.9 too, what is the probability that 
Eleonore is at the party (P(E/K)? To get the answer, we just need to apply 
the probability law above, and we will find P(E/K) ≥ P(E/P&K)×P(P/K), 
which is 0.81, a lower figure than the original ones, which is what 
happens when you multiply fractions. Now, why should we multiply the 
probabilities of Eleonore being at the party if Paul is there and the one 
that Paul is at party to obtain the result? Because they refer to occurrences 
that are supposed to happen together, and the figure is lower because 
if it is uncertain that X will happen, it is even more uncertain that X will 
happen in conjunction with Y.
However, Plantinga does not provide any reason why his formula 
gives a good account of epistemic probability, that is, the probability of a 
thesis in view of evidence. The way he formalizes the question only means 
that the greater the amount of happenings the less probable it is that 
they will occur together. Yet, this is not the way we relate a proposition A. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
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we want to test in view of a set of other propositions. In other words, the 
fact that a man is found stabbed to death in his flat has a low probability, 
the fact that there is a knife near the corpse is also improbable in itself, 
the presence of Jones’s fingerprints on the knife may also be improbable, 
and the fact that Jones might have interest in the victim’s death may 
have an intrinsic low probability too. Still, all these facts are even less 
probable if considered conjointly. However, a very different question is 
assessing how much all these evidences make probable the hypothesis 
that Jones has murdered the victim.
In other words, it is one thing to say that all the events T, A … E have 
a low probability of happening together, but it is a very different one to 
evaluate the probability of G in view of those happenings. While the joint 
probability of G occurring together with T, A … E is necessarily lower 
the more items you consider (given that their probabilities are not zero 
or one), the epistemic probability of G in view of those propositions may 
either increase or decrease, depending on how much the total evidence 
available confirms G.
So, as a first argument against Plantinga’s account, it seems intuitively 
weird that the more evidence you have in favor of an idea the less this 
idea gets confirmed. In addition, if we use the Bayesian method, the 
strange result Plantinga found does not obtain, and perhaps this is a good 
reason to think that Bayesianism is not so useless as an interpretation of 
rationality as Plantinga argued.
3  Many Types of Bayesianism and Cumulative Probability
As says the title of a paper by the statistician Irving Good, there are 
(at least?) 46.656 varieties of Bayesians (Good, 1983). So, for example, 
Richard Swinburne’s Bayesianism is not the same as the one Plantinga 
expounded and criticized in Warrant: the Current Debate (1993a).
All Bayesians assume that belief is something that can be measured 
by probability. One of the crucial differences among them is the theory 
of probability they assume. Subjective probability, stated in terms of 
betting behavior, is the most common amongst them, but it is not the 
only one. Swinburne, for example, assumes the so-called logical theory 
of probability, according to which probability “is a measure of the extent 
to which one proposition r makes another one q likely to be true (r and q 
may be complicated conjunctions or disjunctions of other propositions)” 
(Swinburne, 2001, p. 62). This type of probability is concerned with the 
extent to which a proposition provides reason for believing another one.
It is from the logical relationship that characterizes inductive 
probability that Swinburne extracts the concept of logical probability, A. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
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which will be crucial to his probabilistic theory. Logical probability is 
a type of inductive probability in which the inductive support that a 
proposition q gives to a proposition r is measured not only by all the 
relevant logical possibilities and corresponding entailments, but also by 
the correct inductive criteria. A value that ideally could only be reached 
by a logically omniscient being, but “[…] to which we try to conform our 
judgments of inductive probability on evidence but about the value of 
which we may make mistakes”, says Swinburne (2001, p. 64). In other 
words, the value of a logical probability is totally determined a priori, 
according to the logical relationship between the actual contents of the 
propositions concerned and the correct inductive criteria known by a 
logically omniscient being.
As said above, another important common trace among Bayesians 
is the idea that the assessment of a hypothetical belief h (that is its 
‘posterior probability’) should be done with the help of Bayes’s theorem, 
which is deduced from the axioms of probability calculus. So, Bayes’s 
theorem permits to distinguish between the prior probability of h and its 
explanatory power, formalized as follows (in the notation below, ‘.’ means 
‘and’. ‘e’ stands for the evidence and ‘k’ for the background knowledge 
apart from e):
P h e k
P e h k
P e k
P h k ( / . )
( / . )
( / )
( / ) = ×
          Posterior   Explanatory          Prior
probability of h          power of h        probability of h
While in the subjective theory prior probability is the personal 
degree of belief by a subject S, in the logical theory it is the degree of 
belief permitted by correct criteria of induction, such as the principle of 
simplicity (the simpler a theory the more probable it is ceteris paribus), for 
instance. The coherence constraint is also assumed in the logical theory, 
but it is taken as measure of logical consistency. As to conditionalization, 
this is viewed as the way we should update our prior probability in view 
of evidence, so that if the posterior probability is higher than the prior, 
the hypothesis has been confirmed by evidence; yet, if the posterior is 
lower than the prior, the hypothesis has been disconfirmed by evidence.
According to the conditionalization rule the prior probability of h at 
any one point is a function of its posterior probability in the preceding 
link in the chain. Applying this notion, we have the following means of A. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
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calculating the probability of a hypothesis in the light of many cumulative 
pieces of evidence in Bayes’s theorem:
•  for evidence e1: 
) / (
) / ( ) . / (
) . / (
1
1
1 k e P
k h P k h e P
k e h P
×
=
•  for evidence e2: 
) . / (
) . / ( ) . . / (
) . . / (
1 2
1 1 2
1 2 e k e P
k e h P e k h e P
k e e h P
×
=
•  for evidence e3: 
) . . / (
) . . / ( ) . . . / (
) . . . / (
2 1 3
1 2 2 1 3
1 2 3 e e k e P
k e e h P e e k h e P
k e e e h P
×
=
•  for e7: 
    
) . . . . . . / (
) . . . . . . / ( ) . . . . . . . / (
) . . . . . . . / (
6 5 4 3 2 1 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 6 5 4 3 2 1 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 e e e e e e k e P
k e e e e e e h P e e e e e e k h e P
k e e e e e e e h P
×
=
This is the notion presupposed in Swinburne’s inductive cumulative 
case for theism. Separately, each piece of evidence in its favor may be 
weak, but when taken jointly, they can make up a considerably strong 
argument (Swinburne, 2004). However, Swinburne’s insistence on the 
principle of simplicity sometimes obscures the crucial importance of 
conditionalization in a Bayesian analysis. So, what will be said below is 
not intended as a defense of Swinburne’s approach, but of what I see as 
a better interpretation of the Bayesian method applied to the problem of 
dwindling probabilities.
Now, applying the above ideas to the problem put forward by 
Plantinga, a Bayesian analysis needs to ascribe figures to two concepts 
that Plantinga has not employed: the prior probability of the thesis 
under assessment and the probability of each piece of evidence given 
background knowledge. Before going into it, let us say a brief word 
about using numbers in this kind of reasoning. It certainly sounds 
artificial stating that the prior belief degree in the Christian Gospel has 
a definite numerical value for someone, but this artifice is very useful 
to see what follows from our beliefs, which is an important means to 
evaluate their reasonableness. In addition, the assignment of a value is 
a very common practice in academic evaluation, for example, where a 
student’s performance in a test or assignment is ordinarily described in 
numeric terms.
Bearing this in mind, from a Bayesian point of view, the first estimate 
lacking in Plantinga’s analysis is the prior probability of G (belief in the A. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
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Christian Gospel). Let us assume a very low degree, typical of someone 
who does not believe it. In addition, following Plantinga (see 2000, 
p. 274ff.), let us assign high probabilities to pieces of evidence from T to E 
in view of G, i.e. P(T… E/G). Apart from this, we need to attribute a value 
to each piece of evidence in view only of natural background knowledge 
(i.e. excluding G). Given the religious character of the evidence enlisted, 
it seems reasonable to attribute a low epistemic probability for T (the 
first piece considered) given the other beliefs the skeptic has, let us 
put it at 0.2 then. Bear in mind that the prior probability of each piece 
of evidence will have to cohere with previous evidence accrued to the 
background knowledge, so that the starting figure may increase or 
decrease depending on what means the evidence added up, that is, on 
whether they confirm or not the hypothesis.
Now, following Plantinga’s instances of evidence, let us assess the 
probability of P(G/T… E&K), taking each piece in turn.
Recalling the considerations above, we may plausibly consider that 
for the skeptic who ascribes to G (the Gospel) a prior probability of 0.1, 
the probability of T (theism) in itself is also low, let us say 0.2, but that, 
in view of the truth of G (the central Christian doctrines) (P(T/G&K)), 
T gets very probable. Again, following Plantinga’s assignment, let us 
ascribe 0.9 to it.
In this case, P(G/T&K) will be
P(G/T&K)= P(T/G&K) ×P(G/K) 
     P(T/K)
Using the figures indicated above, we will have P(G/T&K)=0.45. In 
other words, T (the existence of God), even if not very probable in itself 
for the skeptic, is able to raise G’s probability from 0.1 to 0.45 if calculated 
in the Bayesian way.
The next piece of evidence (A  =  God would make some kind of 
revelation to humankind) will be considered in Bayes’s theorem as 
follows:
P(G/T&A&K)= P(A/G&K&T) ×P(G/T&K) 
     
P(A/T&K)
Now the prior probability of G is the posterior probability obtained in 
the preceding calculation (0.45). Let us assume again 0.9 for the likelihood 
of A given G, K and T, and ascribe a value to P(A/T&K) that is plausible 
for a rational skeptic: 0.5 let us say. A “rational skeptic” in a Bayesian 
sense is someone who is both coherent with his religious skepticism and A. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
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with the axioms of the probability calculus, so that he will not assign 
to P(A/T&K) a value that will render a posterior probability of G that is 
higher than 1 or lower than 0. The result will be 0.81, which is another 
step in the confirmation of G.
One more exercise of the type above will be enough to ground some of 
the concluding considerations of this article. Let us take into account the 
following piece of evidence provided by Plantinga: B = Jesus teachings 
were such that they could be sensibly interpreted and extrapolated to 
G. In the theorem, B will be introduced this way:
P(G/T&A&B&K)= P(B/G&T&A&K) ×P(G/T&A&K)
     P(B/T&A&K)
Similar considerations will be made here as regards the figures 
involved. The prior probability of G is the result of the preceding calculation 
(0.81). The likelihood of B (its probability given G&T&A&K) will again be 
0.9, and the expectancy of B (its probability given all evidence already 
known in the process – except G, which is not a piece of evidence, but 
the hypothesis under assessment) will need to rise accordingly. Let us 
assume 0.8 for our reluctant but rational skeptic. The result will be 0.91 
this time.
I will save the reader’s time and forgo further numbers and 
calculations. The morals of this story is that, in opposition to Plantinga’s 
principle of dwindling probability, the more evidence considered in 
favor of the Christian doctrines, the more it gets confirmed by it, as long 
as the Bayesian method of calculating the probabilities concerned is 
assumed. However, although a hypothesis may get increasingly confirmed 
by favorable pieces of evidence, the constraints of the probability 
calculus will see to it that it will never reach the value of 1, which figure 
corresponds to absolute certainty. As John Earman said in another 
context, there is a “curious blend of inductivism and anti-inductivism 
that flows from the Bayesian analysis” (Earman 2000, p. 28). In other 
words, the Bayesian analysis is able to provide a rigorous account of 
inductive reasoning in contexts of uncertainty. However, it also shows 
that no matter how many pieces of evidence are given in favor of a 
hypothesis, it will never get totally confirmed; there will always be some 
room for doubt.
4  Concluding Remarks
So, if Plantinga were to use the Bayesian method, the probability of 
the Gospel’s reliability as God’s revelation would not diminish at the A. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
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consideration of each favorable piece of evidence, but rather increase, up 
to a level very close to 1, which is a degree equivalent to a very strong 
belief.
Now, strong belief is not the same as certainty, which is presupposed 
in the attitude of faith. So, perhaps Plantinga is right in saying that 
only reason is not enough to ground faith and something else, like 
the instigation of the Holy Spirit for example is also needed to take a 
human being to faith, even if the problem of dwindling probabilities is 
resolved.
It is not the place to go deeper into this question. Yet, it might 
be interesting to notice that an alternative to Plantinga’s stance is 
Swinburne’s position that belief is just a component of faith, the theoretical 
one. The practical element of faith, which justifies it can be praised, since 
it depends on voluntary decision, is commitment. Conviction in the 
Christian view is perhaps better interpreted as a practical commitment 
instead of theoretical certainty. If so, the Christian faith is compatible with 
a degree of belief not equal to 1 in probabilistic terms. The ideal faithful 
may have some small space for doubt, but his practice is entirely devoted 
to God’s will. Swinburne elaborates this point in Faith and Reason 
(2005), and I comment on it and compare his approach to Plantinga’s in 
Portugal (2011).
From what has been said so far, the Bayesian concept of rationality 
includes three elements. Firstly, it postulates that in order to be rational 
one must be logically consistent, which is the coherence constraint put 
in terms of the logical theory of probability. Secondly, it demands that 
our belief degree should be updated in light of new information, which 
corresponds to an interesting dynamic dimension of rationality. Thirdly, 
in order that a belief degree may be considered rational, it must be 
proportional to the degree of confirmation provided by the total evidence 
available to the believer. Apart from this, Bayes’s theorem may be taken 
as an useful instrument for assessing our belief degrees and the way it 
changes in view of all we know, and as such an important algorithm able 
to evaluate the rationality of our beliefs and our inductive inferences in 
the sense above.
In addition, Swinburne’s Bayesian approach exemplifies the fact that 
rebutting subjective Bayesianism does not mean rebutting Bayesianism 
itself. Plantinga is probably right in saying that Bayesians do not give 
a sufficient account of either warrant or rationality. Even so, one still 
might say that they give interesting clues to what is involved in inductive 
reasoning from a formal point of view, and this matters quite a bit to those 
interested in the assessment of beliefs.A. C. Portugal – Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs
  Veritas, v. 57, n. 2, maio/ago. 2012, p. 15-25  25
References
EARMAN, John. Hume’s Abject Failure – The Argument against Miracles. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000.
GOOD, Irving. “46646 Varieties of Bayesians”. In: GOOD, Irving. Thinking Good – 
The Foundations of Probability and its Applications. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota 
University Press, 1983.
PLANTINGA, Alvin. Warrant: The Current Debate. New York-Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993a.
______. Warrant and Proper Function. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993b.
______. Warranted Christian Belief. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
PORTUGAL, Agnaldo. “Fé, razão e salto no escuro – Uma Comparação entre Plantinga 
e Swinburne [Faith, Reason and Leap in the Dark – A Comparison between Plantinga 
and Swinburne]”. In: Veritas, 56 (2011): 2, p. 18-31.
SWINBURNE, Richard. Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
______. Faith and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 22005.
______. The Existence of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 22004.
Recebido em 08/03/2012.
Aprovado para publicação em 09/07/2012.